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Abstract
The New York State on Pause executive order came into effect on March 22 with the goal of
ensuring adequate social distancing to alleviate the spread of COVID-19. Pause will remain
effective in New York City in some form until early June. We use a compartmentalized model
to study the effects of testing capacity and social distancing measures on the evolution of the
pandemic in the post-Pause period in the City. We find that testing capacity must increase
dramatically if it is to counterbalance even relatively small relaxations in social distancing
measures in the immediate post-Pause period. In particular, if the City performs 20,000 tests
per day and relaxes the social distancing measures to the pre-Pause norms, then the total number
of deaths by the end of September can reach 250,000. By keeping the social distancing measures
to somewhere halfway between the pre- and in-Pause norms and performing 100,000 tests per
day, the total number of deaths by the end of September can be kept at around 27,000. Going
back to the pre-Pause social distancing norms quickly must be accompanied by an exorbitant
testing capacity, if one is to suppress excessive deaths. If the City is to go back to the pre-Pause
social distancing norms in the immediate post-Pause period and keep the total number of deaths
by the end of September at around 35,000, then it should be performing 500,000 tests per day.
Our findings have important implications on the magnitude of the testing capacity the City
needs as it relaxes the social distancing measures to reopen its economy.
1. Background and Overview
In this study, we analyze the impact of social distancing measures and testing capacity on the
evolution of COVID-19 in New York City. On March 22, the New York State on Pause executive
order came into effect to ensure adequate social distancing and it has been helpful in controlling
the spread of the disease and preventing healthcare resources from stretching too thin. Pause will
remain in effect in the City in some form until early June. Social distancing measures, to the degree
they are practiced today, are not sustainable. Testing, particularly together with contact tracing,
could help relax social distancing measures, facilitating the partial reopening of the economy while
keeping the spread of the disease under control. However, the level of testing capacity necessary to
allow noticeable relaxation in the social distancing norms and to help reopen the economy is not
yet clear. We consider various possibilities regarding the social distancing measures and testing
capacity availability in the immediate post-Pause period. We project the evolution of the pandemic
in the City until the end of September. To make our projections, we use a compartmentalized model
that captures the limited availability of testing capacity, while allowing some contact tracing to
identify, test, and isolate individuals at risk.
We find that testing capacity must increase dramatically if it is to counterbalance somewhat
small levels of relaxation in the social distancing measures in the post-Pause period. If the social
distancing measures in the post-Pause period are relaxed to pre-Pause norms and the City continues
∗Email addresses of the authors are oe2148@columbia.edu, ms3268@cornell.edu, rusmevic@marshall.usc.edu,
topaloglu@orie.cornell.edu, and ziya@email.unc.edu.
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to perform 20,000 tests per day, then the number of deaths by the end of September can reach
250,000. If the social distancing norms are fully relaxed, then even with a testing capacity of
100,000 per day, the City still faces a second wave of the pandemic that would likely supersede the
one it experienced in April. By keeping the social distancing measures halfway between the pre-
and in-Pause levels and performing 100,000 tests per day in the post-Pause period, the number of
deaths by the end of September can be kept at around 27,000. If the City is to go back to pre-Pause
social distancing norms and keep the number of deaths by the end of September under 35,000, then
it should be performing 500,000 tests per day. The message is clear. If one considers for a moment
going back to the pre-Pause life quickly in the post-Pause period, then the City should be ramping
up its testing capacity to 500,000, but even then, there will be a price to pay.
2. Compartmentalized Model
Our model follows the standard susceptible-infected-recovered paradigm with compartments
capturing individuals classified along the dimensions of infected, noninfected, and recovered, as
well as symptomatic-isolated, asymptomatic-isolated, and asymptomatic-nonisolated. Once an
individual is tested positive, a certain number of individuals who are expected to have been in close
contact with the positive individual are transferred to a certain isolated compartment. In this way,
we build a contact tracing mechanism to ensure that those who have been in contact with a positive
individual reduce their contact with the rest of the population. Running our model with a starting
date of March 2, we get a trajectory of the pandemic that is in reasonably close agreement with
the actual trajectory in the City so far. In the appendix, we give a discussion of our model and
provide comparisons of its output with the actual trajectory of the pandemic.
3. A Close Look at Two Testing Scenarios
In the top and bottom panels of Figure 1, we give the trajectory of projected daily deaths under two
testing capacity scenarios of 20,000 and 100,000 tests per day. Each data series in the two panels
corresponds to a different level of social distancing practiced in the post-Pause period, expressed as
a percentage relaxation in the in-Pause social distancing norms. Specifically, 0% is no relaxation,
corresponding to the strictest level of social distancing that was implemented in the in-Pause period,
whereas 100% is full relaxation, corresponding to no social distancing, as in life in the pre-Pause
period. Other percentages reflect different levels of relaxation the City may consider, each with a
certain R-naught value between the two extremes. All newly-imposed social distancing measures
come into effect on June 1, the beginning of the post-Pause period. The testing capacities of 20,000
and 100,000 tests per day represent the current situation and an order of magnitude bump.
Noting the purple data series in the figure, fully relaxing the social distancing measures
immediately in the post-Pause period and going back to pre-Pause practices will lead to another
wave peaking in late August, regardless of whether the City has 20,000 or 100,000 per day testing
capacity. Testing capacity will surely have an impact on the size of the next wave. Under 20,000 per
day testing capacity, full relaxation of social distancing measures will result in 252,000 deaths by
the end of September. Note that the labels on the right end of each panel give the total number of
deaths by the end of September. Even with 100,000 per day testing capacity, if the social distancing
norms are fully relaxed in the post-Pause period, then the next wave in August will be significantly
larger than what the City already experienced in April, ultimately resulting in 109,000 deaths by
the end of September.
Thus, quickly going back to the pre-Pause practices in the post-Pause period will likely have
dramatic consequences even if the City can perform 100,000 tests per day. Consider following
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20,000 tests per day
251,837 deaths
75,516
29,998
24,399
23,652
100,000 tests per day
108,631 deaths
52,026
27,241
24,119
23,604
Figure 1: Trajectory of the daily deaths under testing capacities of 20,000 and 100,000 per day.
social distancing measures somewhere halfway between the pre- and in-Pause levels, corresponding
to the green data series in the figure. In this case, if the City keeps on performing 20,000 tests
per day in the post-Pause period, then the number of deaths by the end of September adds up to
30,000. Increasing the testing capacity to 100,000 per day reduces the number of deaths by the end
of September to 27,000, but even in this case, the daily deaths demonstrate a slightly increasing
trend at the end of September.
Being more liberal with the social distancing measures in the post-Pause period and relaxing
them even more than halfway between the pre- and in-Pause levels will be problematic. Consider
relaxing the social distancing measures by 75%, corresponding to the red data series in the figure.
Under both testing capacities of 20,000 and 100,000 per day, a second wave picks up at the end of
September. The testing capacity will affect the magnitude of the wave, but the number of deaths
by the end of August reaches 52,000 even with a testing capacity of 100,000 per day.
In Figure 1, full (100%) and no (0%) relaxation in social distancing practices correspond to life
before and after March 22. We emphasize that the interpretation of other levels of social distancing
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measures requires more care. In particular, the other levels of social distancing measures correspond
to different R-naught values between the two extremes and they should not be interpreted as a
suggested level of occupancy in business establishments. There is work to be done to convert these
social distancing levels into public health policy.
4. What Level of Testing Capacity Allows for Reopening
The discussion in the previous section indicates there are risks if the City quickly relaxes the social
distancing norms in the post-Pause period. A natural question is what testing capacity would likely
be sufficient to keep the risk of a second wave at bay while relaxing the social distancing measures
to a degree that the economy can start functioning.
In the top panel of Figure 2, we show the tradeoff between the total number of deaths by the end
of September and the level of social distancing practiced, under different testing capacities. The
horizontal axis shows the level of social distancing, expressed, as before, as a percentage relaxation
in the in-Pause social distancing norms. Thus, 0% is no relaxation, corresponding to the strictest
level of social distancing observed during Pause, whereas 100% is full relaxation, corresponding
to the loosest level of social distancing that was in the pre-Pause period. The vertical axis shows
the total number of projected deaths by the end of September. Each data series corresponds to a
different level of testing capacity. In the bottom panel of Figure 2, we give the same information
but zoom in on the more relevant region of social distancing measures. In our model, all new testing
capacity and social distancing norms become effective on June 1. Before May 1, we use the actual
number of tests performed by the City and extrapolate between early-May and June 1.
A good starting point is to consider the case where the City relaxes the social distancing
measures halfway between the pre- and in-Pause norms, corresponding to 50% on the horizontal
axis in the figure. Keeping the social distancing measures any stricter will likely not be useful for
reopening the economy. We observe that keeping a testing capacity of 20,000 per day results in a
total of 30,000 deaths by the end of September. Raising the testing capacity to 100,000 per day
reduces the number of deaths by the end of September to 27,000. Consider relaxing the in-Pause
social distancing measures by 75% during the post-Pause period. Even by performing 250,000 tests
per day, the total number of deaths by the end of September can only be kept at 34,000. Thus,
if one considers for a moment quickly going back to the pre-Pause life, then the City should be
ramping up its testing capacity dramatically, up to 500,000 per day. Even then, there will be a
price to pay and testing is far from being a perfect substitute for social distancing.
5. Discussion and Next Steps
The analysis in this study puts all new social distancing measures and testing capacities into effect
immediately on June 1. In practice, the change will be gradual. Our model provides a tool to
investigate how to relax social distancing measures gradually as the City ramps up its testing
capacity over time. An analysis along these lines will be our next line of attack. Moreover, as
discussed in the appendix, we have a contact tracing mechanism in our model, where close contacts
of every positive case are put into isolation. In other words, our model implicitly assumes that the
bottleneck is the testing capacity, not the contract tracing capacity. We plan to use our model to
estimate the number of contact tracers needed to keep up with the increasing testing capacity and
new cases. The interpretation of the pre- and in-Pause social distancing measures are somewhat
clear, each corresponding to life before and after March 22. Relaxing social distancing measures
by any percentage corresponds to adjusting R-naught to lie appropriately between the R-naught
values of these two extremes. It should be noted that it will require work to understand which
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Figure 2: Tradeoff between the deaths by the end of September and the social distancing norms.
public health policy would achieve what level of R-naught value. Lastly, we believe that the death
projections from our model are on the optimistic side, because our model assumes the presence
of a streamlined tracing mechanism and individuals in certain compartments are willing to isolate
themselves, infecting others minimally. Such optimistic behavior of our model should be taken into
consideration when interpreting our results.
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Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows. In Appendix A, we discuss our model at a high level. This
section avoids any technical details but it is useful for seeing how our model works, what
compartments it uses, and how the different compartments interact with each other. In Appendix B,
we provide the full mathematical details of our model. In Appendix C, we elaborate on the
parameters of our model and how they are estimated. We borrow some of the parameters from
the literature and derive others based off of problem primitives. We explain how we arrive at the
derived model parameters. In Appendix D, we compare the output of our model with the trajectory
of the pandemic in the City until early May and demonstrate that our model does a reasonably
good job of predicting the trajectory that has been observed so far.
A. Model at a High Level
In our model, we capture the two benefits of testing, which are isolating the specific individual
tested positive and tracing the contacts of the positive individual. In particular, our model
distinguishes the infected individuals who know that they are infected from the infected individuals
who do not know whether they are infected. Once a person is tested positive, this person
is an infected individual who knows that she is infected. Such a person minimally infects
others. Moreover, considering the individuals who do not know whether they are infected, we
classify them as symptomatic-isolated, asymptomatic-isolated, or asymptomatic-nonisolated. Once
an individual is tested positive, a certain number of people around this person are classified
as asymptomatic-isolated people, so these individuals reduce their contact with the general
population, preventing them from infecting others to some extent.
Our model follows the standard susceptible-infected-recovered modeling paradigm. In Figure 3,
we show the compartments in our model. The boxes represent the compartments. The arrows
represent the possible flows between the compartments. The three compartments on the right of
the figure capture the individuals who know that they are infected. In particular, the compartment
labeled “KI” corresponds to the infected individuals who know that they are infected and not (yet)
hospitalized. The compartment labeled “H” captures the infected individuals who are hospitalized.
The individuals in the latter compartment also know that they are infected. The compartment
labeled “KR” captures the recovered individuals who knew that they were infected. Perhaps
optimistically, in our model, the individuals in all of these three compartments minimally infect
others, since they are aware that they were infected.
The nine compartments on the left side of the figure capture the individuals who do not know
whether they are infected. Some of these individuals will, in actuality, be infected, some will
be noninfected, and some will even have recovered without knowing they had been infected. We
classify the individuals who do not know whether they are infected along two dimensions. In
the first dimension, any such individual could be symptomatic-isolated, asymptomatic-isolated, or
asymptomatic-nonisolated. Asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals do not show symptoms of the
disease and do not make an effort to reduce their contact. Asymptomatic-isolated individuals make
a conscious effort to reduce their contact, mainly because they have been in touch with a person
who tested positive. Symptomatic-isolated individuals show symptoms but do not know whether
they are infected. Their symptoms may be due to other diseases.
Once again, perhaps optimistically, in our model, all symptomatic individuals isolate themselves,
so we do not have a compartment for symptomatic-nonisolated people. Symptomatic-isolated
and asymptomatic-isolated individuals infect others with a smaller rate, when compared with
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Figure 3: Compartments used in our model.
asymptomatic-nonisolated people. When stricter social distancing norms are enforced, all
individuals will reduce their contact with the general population, but we follow the assumption
that asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals will still maintain a higher contact rate with the rest of
the population than asymptomatic-isolated and symptomatic-isolated individuals.
Considering the individuals who do not know whether they are infected, we classify them along
another dimension. In this second dimension, an individual who does not know whether she is
infected could be infected, noninfected, or recovered. Thus, considering the nine compartments on
the left side of Figure 3, the compartment labeled “IAn,” for example, captures the infected and
asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals who do not know whether they are infected. Note that these
individuals are infected in actuality, but they do not know that they are infected and they maintain
a high contract rate with the rest of the population, being nonisolated. When we perform tests on
a segment of a population, the proportion of positive tests is given by the fraction of the infected
individuals in the segment relative to the size of the whole segment. For example, using the label
of a compartment to also denote the number of individuals in the compartment, since there are
NAn + RAn + IAn asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals, if we test T asymptomatic-nonisolated
individuals, then the number of positive tests is T × IAnNAn+RAn+IAn .
So far, we indicated two reasons for our model to be optimistic. In addition, our model assumes
that close contacts of every positive case are traced and these close contacts remain in isolation
for 14 days or until they are tested negative. In other words, our model implicitly assumes that
the bottleneck is the testing capacity, not contact tracing capacity. It is important to note that
growing the testing capacity in the City beyond a certain level without growing the contact tracing
capacity will not be of much benefit, so any decision regarding how much to grow the contact
tracing capacity should be directly informed by the plans to grow the testing capacity.
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B. Mathematical Description of the System Dynamics
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the system dynamics of our model. The state
of the system at each time period t is described by a vector(
ItSi, I
t
Ai, I
t
An, R
t
Si, R
t
Ai, R
t
An, N
t
Si, N
t
Ai, N
t
An, D
t,Ht,KIt,KRt
)
,
where the variables ItSi, I
t
Ai, I
t
An, R
t
Si, R
t
Ai, R
t
An, N
t
Si, N
t
Ai, N
t
An denote the states associated with the
nine compartments on the left side of Figure 3. These nine compartments correspond to individuals
whose COVID-19 status is unknown. The variable Dt denotes the number of individuals who die
in period t, and the variableHt denotes the number of individuals who are hospitalized in period t.
The variable KIt captures the number of individuals who have been confirmed to have COVID-19
and are currently infected in period t. The variable KRt captures the number of individuals who
have been confirmed to have COVID-19 and recovered by period t.
Description of Sub-compartments: For our state variables, we use regular font to denote
scalars and bold font to denote vectors. We use vector notation when a compartment has multiple
sub-compartments representing different subgroups of the population. Here are the descriptions of
the sub-compartments.
• Sub-compartments within the ISi compartment: The ISi compartment has 3 sub-compartments:
(a) those who will recover naturally without requiring any hospitalization, (b) those who will
require hospitalization, and (c) those who will die without access to a COVID-19 diagnostic test.
Thus,
ItSi =
(
ItSi(recovered), I
t
Si(hospitalized), I
t
Si(death)
)
.
We use the notation I¯tSi = I
t
Si(recovered) + I
t
Si(hospitalized) + I
t
Si(death) to denote the total
number of individuals in the ISi compartment. The trick we use here is that when an individual
is infected, we immediately decide whether this person will recover, will be hospitalized, or will
die. We keep the identity of the individual accordingly throughout the simulation.
• Sub-compartments within the IAi compartment: The IAi compartment has 2 sub-compartments:
(a) those who will never develop COVID-19 symptoms, and (b) those who will show COVID-19
symptoms but are currently pre-symptomatic. Thus,
ItAi =
(
ItAi(recovered), I
t
Ai(show symptom)
)
,
and we let I¯tAi = I
t
Ai(recovered) + I
t
Ai(show symptom) denote the total number of individuals
in the IAi compartment.
• Sub-compartments within the IAn compartments: Similar to the IAi compartment, the IAn
compartment has 2 sub-compartments: (a) those who will never develop COVID-19 symptoms,
and (b) those who will show COVID-19 symptoms but are currently pre-symptomatic. Thus,
ItAn =
(
ItAn(recovered), I
t
An(show symptom)
)
,
and as before, we let I¯tAn = I
t
An(recovered) + I
t
An(show symptom) denote the total number of
individuals in the IAn compartment.
• Sub-compartments within the H compartment: The H compartment consists of two types of
individuals: (a) those who will die and (b) those who will eventually recover. Thus, we have
Ht =
(
Ht(die), Ht(recovered)
)
.
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• Sub-compartments within the KI compartment: The KI compartment consists of two types
of individuals: (a) those who will require hospitalization and (b) those who will recover without
visiting a hospital. Therefore, we have that KIt =
(
KIt(hospitalized),KIt(recovered)
)
.
Impact of Testing: We assume that the diagnostic test is 100% accurate and the result is
obtained instantaneously. However when we perform the test, we cannot differentiate between
unknown infected, unknown non-infected, and recovered people. We can only test people based on
their observable characteristics. At the beginning of each period, we test TSi symptomatic-isolated
individuals, TAi asymptomatic-isolated individuals, and TAn asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals.
We assume that the tests are administered at random within each of these populations. Let piSi, piAi,
and piAn denote the fraction of symptomatic isolated, asymptomatic isolated, and asymptomatic
non-isolated individuals, respectively, who receive diagnostic tests. Then,
piSi = min
{
T tSi
I¯tSi − ItSi(death) + RtSi + N tSi
, 1
}
,
piAi = min
{
T tAi
I¯tAi + R
t
Ai +N
t
Ai
, 1
}
,
piAn = min
{
T tAn
I¯tAn + R
t
An +N
t
An
, 1
}
.
The above fractions drive the dynamics across compartments, which are described below based
on the events that can occur in our model. In the fraction piSi, we assume that the infected
symptomatic-isolated individuals from the death sub-compartment are inaccessible for testing.
Description of Dynamics Between Compartments: Our description below is organized
by the compartments. For each compartment, we describe the inflows, outflows, and the new state
at time period t+ 1.
• Infected Symptomatic-Isolated Compartment (ISi): As noted earlier, the ISi compartment
has 3 subgroups of individuals: (a) those who will recover naturally without requiring any
hospitalization, (b) those who require hospitalization, and (c) those who die without access
to a COVID-19 diagnostic test. Thus,
ItSi =
(
ItSi(recovered), I
t
Si(hospitalized), I
t
Si(death)
)
,
and I¯tSi = I
t
Si(recovered) + I
t
Si(hospitalized) + I
t
Si(death) denotes the total number of individuals
across the three sub-compartments.
Inflow: The inflow to the ISi compartment consists of 3 sources given by:
– Non-infected symptomatic-isolated (NSi) individuals who did not get tested and were newly
infected during period t. The number of such individuals is given by
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi) ,
where I¯tAn(1−piAn)+ I¯tAi (1−piAi)+ I¯tSi (1−piSi) represents the infected population who remains
untested, and β` represents the effective contact rate among isolated individuals. At the start
of our simulation, we set β` = 1.8823 × 10−8, and starting on March 22, we reduce β` by a
third, to a new value of 6.2742× 10−9; see Section C for more details.
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– Infected asymptomatic-nonisolated (IAn) individuals who become symptomatic. The total
inflow of such individuals is given by
ItAn(show symptom)
infToSympTime
,
where infToSympTime represents the average number of days until an infected person displays
symptoms. In our model, we set infToSympTime to be 5 days; see Section C for more details.
– Infected asymptomatic-isolated (IAi) individuals who become symptomatic. Using a similar
logic as above, the total amount of such inflow is given by
ItAi(show symptom)
infToSympTime
.
We assume that a fraction hospOutOfSympFrac, currently set at 20%, of the total inflow to the
ISi compartment will require hospitalization, and a fraction deathOutOfSympFrac (2%) will die
without being tested. The remaining 1 − hospOutOfSympFrac − deathOutOfSympFrac = 78%
will recover at home. Justifications for these fractions are given in Section C.
Outflow: There are four destinations for the outflow from the ISi compartment.
– Individuals in the “recovered” sub-compartment, ItSi(recovered), will move to the recovered
asymptomatic-nonisolated (RAn) compartment at the rate of 1/sympToRecoveryTime, where
sympToRecoveryTime represents the average time for a symptomatic individual to recover from
the disease. Currently, sympToRecoveryTime is set at 14 days.
– Individuals in the “hospitalized” sub-compartment, ItSi(hospitalized), will move to the H
compartment at the rate of 1/sympToHospTime, where sympToHospTime (5 days) represents
the average number of days from symptom onset until hospitalization.
– Individuals in the “death” sub-compartment, ItSi(death), will move to the death compartment
(D) at the rate of 1/sympToDeathTime, where sympToDeathTime (14 days) denotes the average
time from symptoms onset to death.
– Finally, a fraction piSi in every sub-compartment will move to the known infected
(KI) compartment due to testing.
Update Equations: Let recoverOutOfSympFrac = 1−hospOutOfSympFrac−deathOutOfSympFrac.
We have the following update equations.
It+1Si (recovered)
= ItSi(recovered)× (1− piSi)×
(
1− 1
sympToRecoveryTime
)
+ recoverOutOfSympFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi)
+
ItAn(show symptom)(1− piAn)
infToSympTime
+
ItAi(show symptom)(1− piAi)
infToSympTime
]
,
It+1Si (hospitalized)
= ItSi(hospitalized)× (1− piSi)×
(
1− 1
sympToHospTime
)
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+ hospOutOfSympFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi)
+
ItAn(show symptom)(1− piAn)
infToSympTime
+
ItAi(show symptom)(1− piAi)
infToSympTime
]
,
It+1Si (death)
= ItSi(death)× (1− piSi)×
(
1− 1
sympToDeathTime
)
+ deathOutOfSympFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tSi (1− piSi)
+
ItAn(show symptom)(1− piAn)
infToSympTime
+
ItAi(show symptom)(1− piAi)
infToSympTime
]
.
• Infected Asymptomatic-Isolated Compartment (IAi): We have two sub-compartments
with ItAi =
(
ItAi(recovered), I
t
Ai(show symptom)
)
, and I¯tAi = I
t
Ai(recovered) + I
t
Ai(show symptom)
denotes the total number of individuals across the two sub-compartments.
Inflow: The inflow to the IAi compartment has two sources:
– Non-infected asymptomatic-isolated (NAi) individuals who were not tested and became newly
infected during period t. The number of such individuals is given by
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAi (1− piAi) ,
where β` denotes the effective contact rate for isolated individuals.
– Infected asymptomatic-nonisolated (IAn) individuals who were not tested but were identified
as a close contact of a positive case. These individuals voluntarily self isolate and reduce their
contact rate with others. The number of such individuals is given by
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn) ,
where contactPerPosCase is the average number of contacts per positive case, currently set
at 4, whereas I¯tSipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn denotes the number of positive cases identified that time
period and H¯ is given by
H¯ =
(
likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn)
)
+ (RtAn + R
t
SipiSi + R
t
AipiAi) + (N
t
An + N
t
SipiSi + N
t
AipiAi) ,
where the parameter likOfBeingInfected measures the likelihood that a contacted individual
is in the infected population as compared to the non-infected and recovered populations. We
set likOfBeingInfected at 5.5.
We assume that a fraction symptomFrac, currently set at 50%, of the total inflow to the IAi
compartment will develop symptoms, and the remaining 1−symptomFrac = 50% will not develop
any symptoms.
Outflow: There are three destinations for the outflow from the IAi compartment.
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– The individuals in the “recovered” sub-compartment, ItAi(recovered), will move to the RAn
compartment at the rate of 1/asympToRecoveryTime. The parameter asympToRecoveryTime
represents the average time that an asymptomatic infected person self-isolates after being
identified as a close contact. We currently set this value to 10 days.
– The “show symptom” sub-compartment, ItAi(show symptom), will move to the ISi
compartment at the rate of 1/infToSympTime, where infToSympTime (5 days) is the average
time until symptom onset.
– A fraction piAi of individuals who are tested will move to the known infected
(KI) compartment.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
It+1Ai (recovered)
= ItAi(recovered)× (1− piAi)×
(
1− 1
asympToRecoveryTime
)
+ (1− symptomFrac)×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAi (1− piAi)
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn)
]
,
It+1Ai (show symptom)
= ItAi(show symptom)× (1− piAi)×
(
1− 1
infToSympTime
)
+ symptomFrac×
[
β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAi (1− piAi)
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn)
]
.
• Infected Asymptomatic-Nonisolated Compartment (IAn): We have two sub-
compartments, ItAn =
(
ItAn(recovered), I
t
An(show symptom)
)
, and we denote the total number
of individuals across the two sub-compartments as I¯tAn = I
t
An(recovered) + I
t
An(show symptom).
Inflow: The inflow to the IAn compartment comes from non-infected asymptomatic-nonisolated
NAn individuals who become newly infected during period t. The number of such individuals is
given by (
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAn (1− piAn) ,
where βh represents the effective contact rate among nonisolated individuals. At the start of our
simulation, we set βh = 2.82341 × 10−8, and starting on March 22, we reduce βh by a third,
to a new value of 9.41135 × 10−9; see Section C for more details. We assume that a fraction
symptomFrac, currently set at 50%, of the total inflow to the IAn compartment will develop
symptom, and the remaining 1− symptomFrac = 50% will not develop any symptoms.
Outflow: The outflow from the IAn compartment has four destinations.
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– The individuals in the “recovered” sub-compartment, ItAn(recovered), will move to the RAn
compartment at the rate of 1/asympToRecoveryTime.
– The individuals in the “show symptom” sub-compartment, ItAn(show symptom), will move to
the ISi compartment at the rate of 1/infToSympTime.
– Some individuals who were not tested will reduce their contacts and move to the IAi
compartment. The number of such individuals is
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected× I¯tAn(1− piAn) .
– A fraction piAn of individuals are tested and moved to the known infected KI compartment.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
It+1An (recovered)
= ItAn(recovered)× (1− piAn)×
(
1− 1
asympToRecoveryTime
− contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected
)
+ (1 − symptomFrac)×
[(
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAn (1− piAn)
]
,
It+1An (show symptom)
= ItAn(show symptom)× (1− piAn)×
(
1− 1
infToSympTime
− contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× likOfBeingInfected
)
+ symptomFrac×
[(
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
)
×N tAn (1− piAn)
]
.
• Non-infected Symptomatic-Isolated Compartment (NSi):
Inflow: The inflow to the NSi compartment has two sources:
– Non-infected asymptomatic-nonisolated (NAn) individuals who did not get tested and
developed symptoms caused by another condition or disease such as the seasonal flu. There
are N tAn + N
t
SipiSi + N
t
AipiAi such individuals. The rate that an individual develops symptoms
due to a non-COVID-19 disease is given by the parameter nonCOVIDSymptRate, which we
currently set at 1/1200; see Section C for more details on how we arrive at this number.
– Non-infected asymptomatic-isolated (NAi) individuals can also develop flu-like symptoms.
There are N tAi × (1− piAi) such individuals.
Outflow: The outflow from the NSi compartment has three destinations:
– Individuals who are tested will return negative and move to the NAn compartment. This causes
them to increase their contact with other individuals.
– Some individuals will become infected from coming in contact with infected people.
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– Individuals leave self-quarantine at a rate of 1/selfQuarTime, where selfQuarTime is the
average time that an individual self-isolates. We currently set this value to 10 days.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
N t+1Si = N
t
Si × (1− piSi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
− β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
))
+ nonCOVIDSymptRate× (N tSipiSi + N tAi + N tAn) .
• Non-infected Asymptomatic-Isolated Compartment (NAi):
Inflow: The inflow to the NAi compartment comes from individuals in the NAn compartment who
reduce their exposure to other individuals after being identified as a close contact. The number
of such individuals is given by
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (N tAn + N tSipiSi + N tAipiAi) ,
where contactPerPosCase is the average number of contacts per positive case, currently set
at 4, and H¯ denotes the total number of high-contact individuals; see the discussion in the IAi
compartment.
Outflow: The outflow from the NAi compartment has four destinations.
– Individuals who are tested will test negative and move to the NAn compartment, end their
self-isolation, and increase their contacts.
– Untested individuals leave self-isolation at a rate of 1/selfQuarTime.
– Some individuals will become infected and move to the IAi compartment.
– Some individuals will develop flu-like symptoms but not COVID-19, at the rate of
nonCOVIDSymptRate.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
N t+1Ai = N
t
Ai × (1− piAi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
− nonCOVIDSymptRate
− β` ×
(
I¯tAn(1− piAn) + I¯tAi (1− piAi) + I¯tSi (1− piSi)
))
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (N tAn + N tSipiSi + N tAipiAi) .
• Non-infected Asymptomatic-Nonisolated Compartment (NAn):
Inflow: The inflow to the NAn compartment comes from three sources. First, individuals from the
NSi compartment recover from non-COVID-19 symptoms at a rate of
1
selfQuarTime
. Second,
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individuals from the NAi compartment leave self-isolation and increase their contact with others
at a rate of
1
selfQuarTime
. Third, individuals from the NSi and NAi compartments who test
negative will also increase their contact rates.
Outflow: The outflow from the NAn compartment has three destinations. First, some individuals
are identified as close contacts and move to the NAi compartment, thereby reducing their contact
levels. Second, other individuals will develop flu-like symptoms independent of COVID and move
to theNSi compartment at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate. Third, some individuals will become
infected and move to the IAn compartment.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
N t+1An =
(
N tAn + N
t
SipiSi + N
t
AipiAi
)
×
(
1 − nonCOVIDSymptRate − contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
−
(
βhI¯
t
An(1− piAn) + β`I¯tAi (1− piAi) + β`I¯tSi (1− piSi)
))
+
N tAi(1− piAi)
selfQuarTime
+
N tSi(1− piSi)
selfQuarTime
.
• Recovered Symptomatic-Isolated Compartment (RSi):
Inflow: The inflow to the RSi compartment has two sources. Recovered asymptomatic-nonisolated
(RAn) and recovered asymptomatic-isolated (RAi) individuals, who did not get tested, can develop
flu-like symptoms independent of COVID-19, at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate.
Outflow: The outflow from the RSi compartment occurs from individuals who recover from non-
COVID-19 symptoms at the rate of 1/selfQuarTime.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Rt+1Si = R
t
Si × (1− piSi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
)
+ nonCOVIDSymptRate× (RtSipiSi + RtAi + RtAn) .
• Recovered Asymptomatic-Isolated Compartment (RAi):
Inflow: The inflow to the RAi compartment comes from individuals in the RAn compartment who
reduce their exposure to other individuals after being identified as a close contact. The number
of such individuals is given by
contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (RtAn + RtSipiSi + RtAipiAi) ,
16
Outflow: The outflow from the RAi compartment has two destinations. First, untested individuals
leave isolation at the rate of 1/selfQuarTime. Second, other individuals will develop symptoms
independent of COVID-19, at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Rt+1Ai = R
t
Ai × (1− piAi)×
(
1 − 1
selfQuarTime
− nonCOVIDSymptRate
)
+ contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
× (RtAn + RtSipiSi + RtAipiAi) .
• Recovered Asymptomatic-Nonisolated Compartment (RAn):
Inflow: The inflow to the RAn compartment has six sources:
– Untested people from the ISi compartment who recovered naturally.
– Untested people from the IAi compartment who recovered naturally.
– Untested people from the IAn compartment who recovered naturally.
– People from the RAi and RSi compartments who test negative.
– People from the RAi compartment who leave self-quarantine.
– People from the RSi compartment whose non-COVID-19 symptoms disappeared.
Outflow: The outflow from the RAn compartment occurs in two ways. First, some individuals
are identified as close contacts and move to the RAi compartment. Second, some individuals will
develop symptoms independent of COVID-19, at the rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate.
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Rt+1An =
(
RtAn + R
t
SipiSi + R
t
AipiAi
)
×
(
1 − nonCOVIDSymptRate − contactPerPosCase× I¯
t
SipiSi + I¯
t
AipiAi + I¯
t
AnpiAn
H¯
)
+
RtAi(1− piAi)
selfQuarTime
+
RtSi(1− piSi)
selfQuarTime
+
I¯tSi(1− piSi)
sympToRecoveryTime
+
I¯tAi(1− piAi)
asympToRecoveryTime
+
I¯tAn(1− piAn)
asympToRecoveryTime
.
• Known Infected Compartment (KI): This compartment has two sub-compartments, with
KIt =
(
KIt(hospitalized), Ht(recovered)
)
and we have the following dynamics.
Inflow: There are three sources of inflow. The infected individuals in ISi, IAi, and IAn
compartments who are tested. We assume that individuals from the ISi(hospitalized) sub-
compartment flow into the KIt(hospitalized) sub-compartment, and that individuals from the
ISi(recovered) sub-compartment flow into the KI
t(recovered) sub-compartment. We assume
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that hospOutOfSymptFrac (20%) of the individuals from the IAi and IAn compartments require
hospitalization, while the remaining 1 - hospOutOfSymptFrac = 80% will recover naturally.
Outflow: Individuals who require hospitalization move to the H compartment at the rate of
1/infToHospTime, where infToHospTime represents the average time until an infected person
requires hospitalization. We currently set this to 5 days. Individuals who will recover move to the
KR compartment at the rate of 1/sympToRecoveryTime, where sympToRecoveryTime denotes
the average recovery time. We set this to 14 days.
Update Equations: Let recoverOutOfSymptFrac = 1− hospOutOfSymptFrac = 80%. Then,
KIt+1(recovered) =
(
KIt(recovered) + ItSi(recovered)piSi + I
t
Ai(recovered)piAi + I
t
An(recovered)piAn
+ recoverOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn])
×
(
1− 1
sympToRecoveryTime
)
,
KIt+1(hospitalized) =
(
KIt(hospitalized) + ItSi(hospitalized)piSi
+ hospOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn])
×
(
1− 1
infToHospTime
)
.
• Hospitalization Compartment (H): This compartment has two sub-compartments, with
Ht =
(
Ht(die), Ht(recovered)
)
.
Inflow: There are two sources of inflow to the hospitalization compartment: the infected
individuals from the ISi and KI compartments who require hospitalization. We assume that a
fraction deathFrac, currently set at 1/3, of the inflow to the hospitalization compartment will
die. We assume the remaining 1− deathFrac = 2/3 will recover.
Outflow: Individuals who die leave the hospital at the rate of 1/hospToDeathTime, where
hospToDeathTime is the average time between hospitalization and death. Individuals who
will recover move to the KR compartment at the rate of 1/hospToRecoveryTime, where
hospToRecoveryTime is the average time between hospitalization and recovery. We currently
set both to 14 days.
Update Equations: Let recFrac = 1 − deathFrac = 2/3. We have the following update
equations.
Ht+1(die) = Ht(die)×
(
1− 1
hospToDeathTime
)
+
deathFrac
infToHospTime
×
(
ItSi(hosp.)× (1− piSi) + KIt(hosp.) + ItSi(hosp.)piSi
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+ hospOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn]
)
,
Ht+1(recovered) = Ht(recovered)×
(
1− 1
hospToRecoveryTime
)
+
recFrac
infToHospTime
×
(
ItSi(hosp.)× (1− piSi) + KIt(hosp.) + ItSi(hosp.)piSi
+ hospOutOfSymptFrac× [ItAi(sympt.)piAi + ItAn(sympt.)piAn]
)
.
• Known Recovery Compartment (KR):
Update Equations: Let recoverOutOfSymptFrac = 1 − hospOutOfSymptFrac = 80%. We have
the following update equations.
KRt+1 = KRt +
Ht(rec.)
hospToRecoveryTime
+
KIt(rec.)
sympToRecoveryTime
+
ItSi(rec.)piSi + I
t
Ai(rec.)piAi + I
t
An(rec.)piAn
sympToRecoveryTime
+
recoverOutOfSymptFrac×
[
ItAi(sympt.)piAi + I
t
An(sympt.)piAn
]
sympToRecoveryTime
.
• Death Compartment (D):
Update Equations: We have the following update equations.
Dt+1 = Dt +
Ht(die)
hospToDeathTime
+
ItSi(death)
sympToDeathTime
.
C. Model Parameters and Their Estimated Values
In this section, we discuss how we obtain the estimates for different model parameters.
Estimating Flow Rates Between Compartments:
We assume an incubation period of 5 days [8]. After an individual develops symptoms, we
assume it takes another 5 days for the individual to become hospitalized [16]. Specifically, we
set infToSympTime = infToHospTime = sympToHospTime = 5.
We set the recovery time for symptomatic individuals to be 14 days. In our model, we do
not differentiate between recovery at home versus at the hospital and set sympToRecoveryTime =
hospToRecoveryTime = 14. We set the time for a symptomatic individual to die to be 14 days.
Similar to the recovery time, we do not differentiate between deaths at home versus at the hospital
and set both sympToDeathTime = hospToDeathTime = 14 [8].
We assume that individuals who self-isolate after being identified as a close-contact or develop
symptoms from a non-COVID-19 illness spend an average of 10 days reducing their contact with
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others. While the WHO recommends a quarantine period of 14 days, the CDC gives a less stringent
recommendation of 10 days [2]. We set selfQuarTime = asympToRecoveryTime = 10.
In our model, non-infected and recovered individuals develop symptoms due to non-COVID-19
diseases at a rate of nonCOVIDSymptRate = 11200 . This rate is based on the assumption that 10%
of the population is infected over the course of 4 months. This is roughly estimated using the flu
symptom rate in past years as reported by the CDC [3]. We set N = 8, 550, 971, the population of
NYC in 2020 as projected by the City [11]. We also assume that 28, 000 individuals, corresponding
to roughly 3% of the population, initially has symptoms due to the seasonal flu. This is calculated
assuming that flu symptoms last for an average of 4 days.
Estimating Disease Dynamics:
We use sympOutOfInfFrac to denote the fraction of COVID-19 infected individuals who develop
symptoms. Numerous reports have given different estimates for this fraction: from 82% on the
Diamond Princess cruise ship [7] to roughly 40% on the USS Theodore Roosevelt [13]. We set
sympOutOfInfFrac = 50%.
The parameter hospOutOfSympFrac denotes the fraction of symptomatic individuals who need
hospitalization. We set this value to be 20%. The parameter deathOutOfHospFrac denotes the
fraction of hospitalized individuals who die. We set this value to be 33.3¯%. Both of these values
are roughly estimated using historical hospitalization and death numbers as reported by New York
City [10]. Finally, we assume that some portion of the infected population die at home without
hospitalization. We denote this portion as deathOutOfInfFrac and set it to 2%. We estimate this
value using the number of probable deaths as reported by the City.
Infection Dynamics and Estimating Contact Rates:
The basic reproductive number, R0, captures the average number of new infections produced by
each infected individual. There are numerous recent studies estimating the value of R0 for COVID-
19. These estimates vary widely, from anywhere between 2.2 [6] and 5.7 [15]. Furthermore, it
is possible that R0 varies across different countries and cities due to climate, environmental, and
sociological differences. As a result, we set R0 = 3.38 according to a tuning procedure using
historical hospitalization and death statistics as reported by New York City. We briefly discuss the
details of this procedure in Section D.
The rate of new infections is controlled by β, the contact rate between infected and non-infected
populations. In a standard compartmentalized model, the number of new infections during any
time period is captured by
β × {# of non-infected individuals} × {# of infected individuals}.
In our model, we have a similar term for every pair of infected and non-infected compartments. We
employ two different contact rates βh and β`, so we differentiate their usage according to whether
we are considering isolating or non-isolating compartments.
We set βh =
R0
N×sympToRecoveryTime and use this as the contact rate between infected and
non-infected compartments that are both non-isolating. When at least one of the compartments
is isolating or symptomatic, we assume that contact between these populations is reduced by one
third and use the contact rate β` =
2
3 × R0N×sympToRecoveryTime .
Beginning on March 22, we reduce both βh and β` by a factor of 1/3. This reduction is due
to social distancing measures associated with the start of NY Pause. We set this reduction to 1/3
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according to a report by SafeGraph which used smartphone location data to estimate the reduction
in foot traffic due to social distancing measures across the United States. Their study shows that
starting March 22, foot traffic in the New York region is at roughly one third of the activity level
recorded in previous years over the same time period [14].
Dynamics of Contact Tracing:
The parameter contactPerPosCase denotes the average number of close contacts that are identified
via tracing for each COVID-19 positive individual. We assume that close contacts are always
identified from within the non-isolating population. The parameter likOfBeingInfected is a
multiplier that captures how much more likely an infected individual will be identified as a close
contact as compared to a non-infected individual. Specifically,
likOfBeingInfected =
P (close-contact | infected)
P (close-contact | non-infected) ,
which can be shown to be equal to
likOfBeingInfected =
P (infected | close-contact)
P (non-infected | close-contact) ÷
P (infected)
P (non-infected)
.
Thus, we need estimates for the proportion of infected versus non-infected individuals within
the non-isolating population as well as the proportion of infected versus non-infected individuals
among people identified as close contacts. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge there are no
studies that can be used to estimate these proportions for New York City. Therefore, we use data
reported for Wuhan, the capital of Hubei province in China, to estimate these proportions. Wuhan
has a population of approximately 11 million people and is comparable in size to New York City.
It experienced a surge of COVID-19 cases similar to that of New York City.
To estimate contactPerPosCase and the proportion of infected and non-infected individuals
within the close-contact group, we use the results of [1], a comprehensive study on contact tracing.
This study reports the results of contact tracing in Shenzhen, China but the index cases are
mostly travelers arriving from Hubei province. In this study, the authors identified 1,286 close
contacts based on 292 COVID-positive cases. This suggests an average close contact group size of
1286/292 = 4.4 for each COVID-positive individual identified. According to recent news articles,
the state of Massachusetts, which has recently initiated a comprehensive contact-tracing effort,
found that the average close contact group size is two [9]. Therefore, we set the parameter
contactPerPosCase to 4 in our model. Of the 1,286 close contacts, 98 tested positive. Thus,
we estimated the proportion of the infected to non-infected within the close contact group to be
P (infected|close-contact)/P (non-infected|close-contact) = 98/1188 = 0.082.
To estimate P (infected)/P (non-infected), the proportion of infected to non-infected in the
general non-isolating population, we used the following approach. According to a recent study,
in Wuhan, the probability of death after developing symptoms was 1.4% [5]. Using this estimate
and the number of deaths in Wuhan, which is reported as 4,512 by the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus
Resource Center [4], we can estimate the total number of infected individuals in Wuhan to be
322,286. This estimates the total number of infected individuals over the entire course of the
pandemic in Wuhan. In order to estimate the total number of infected individuals at some random
time between mid-January and mid-February, we divide this by two and use 161,143 as the average
number of infected individuals at a given time. This approximation implicitly assumes a linear
build-up of new COVID-positive cases, which is not true for infection spread within a population,
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but nevertheless serves as a reasonable rough estimate. Then, using 11,000,000 for the population of
Wuhan, we estimate P (infected)/P (non-infected) to be 161, 143/(11, 000, 000− 161, 143) = 0.015.
Finally, using our estimates for the infected to non-infected proportion within the close-contacts
and within the general non-isolating population, we estimated the ratio of these two proportions
to be 0.082/0.015 = 5.47 and set likOfBeingInfected to 5.5.
D. Model Validation
We manually calbirated two parameters of the model to roughly match its output to the observed
trajectory of the pandemic up until April 15. These two parameters are the R0 value and the initial
number of infected asymptomatic-nonisolated individuals on March 2. We ended up with an R0
value of 3.38 and an initial infected asymptomatic-nonisolated population of about 10,000. These
starting parameters are tuned based on hospitalization, death, and test data up to April 15. We
use testing data from NYS Health department [12]. We assume that the tests are conducted daily
on people in the order of symptomatic, isolated, and finally non-isolated people.
The plots in Figure 4 show the epidemic trajectory as predicted by our model. In particular,
Figure 4a shows the total number of currently hospitalized, symptomatic infected, asymptomatic
infected and known infected people on each day as projected by the model. In Figure 4b, we
compare the cumulative number of deaths predicted by our model with the actual cumulative
number of deaths. The data set from NYC Health includes confirmed and probable deaths due to
COVID-19. A death is classified as probable if the decedent was a New York City resident who
had no known positive laboratory test for COVID-19 but the death certificate lists as a cause of
death “COVID-19” or equivalent. We show both confirmed deaths and probable deaths in our
plots. In Figure 4c, we plot the actual daily number of tests conducted and positive cases found
in the City. We use the same historical testing capacity in our model. We set the testing capacity
to 20,000 in the City for future projections in this plot. Note that the daily number of positive
tests in our model fluctuates because we use the actual number of tests performed in the City until
early May as the number of tests performed in our model. However, the number of positive cases
identified in our model emerges from the internal behavior of our model. The fit between the model
and the actual trajectory in terms of positive cases is reasonably good. Figure 4d shows the daily
hospitalizations reported by NYC Health against the number of hospitalizations projected by our
model. Figure 4e plots the daily deaths projected by our model against the daily deaths reported
by NYC Health, including probable deaths.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the actual trajectory of the pandemic and the model.
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